

Rising China in Africa

Fall Semester 2023

IAFF 6385.10

CRN 44790

Tuesday 5:10 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.
Tompkins 301

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Course Description and Objective

This course looks at the totality of the China-Africa relationship historically, currently and into the future. It is based on research beginning in 2007 for a book that I co-authored with Josh Eisenman and published in 2012 titled *China and Africa: A Century of Engagement*. We recently finished a second book titled *China's Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement*, which focuses on the China-Africa security and political relationship. Published in 2023 by Columbia University Press, it is the one for this course. Fortunately, there is a reasonably priced soft cover and E-book version. The course, which covers both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, pays special attention to China's strategic relationship with Africa.

Required Reading

In addition to the book cited above, which will be available in the university bookstore and on-line, the readings for each class come from chapters in other books, journal articles, reports/studies prepared by governments, think tanks, NGOs, international organizations, academics, and journalists. All required reading except for our book is available by direct link, on the Gelman Library E-Journal system or posted on Blackboard.

Basis for Grading

Three-quarters of the grade will be based on two papers mutually agreed upon by you and by me. Please send by email no later than 8 September a one paragraph (double spaced) proposal that briefly outlines your first paper, which is due 10 October. The one paragraph proposal for the second paper is due by email no later than 17 October and the paper is due 28 November. Each paper should be double-spaced, 12-point, Times New Roman **no less than 10 full pages and no more than 12 pages**, including footnotes. In addition to a paper that is strong on substance, I put a premium on clear and concise drafting and accurate footnotes that follow the Chicago system. I will provide you with a simplified version of Chicago citations. You can also follow the footnote system used in our book *China's Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement*. Do **NOT** include a bibliography as good footnotes make it unnecessary. Late papers will be penalized. A 10-page paper will be graded the same as a 12-page paper. I am looking for quality, not quantity. Early in the course, I will email to you my extensive China-Africa bibliography. The entries cover all topics dealing with China-Africa relations and should help you identify sources on whatever topic you wish to write about. I encourage you to use additional sources not included in my bibliography.

One-quarter of the grade will be based on class participation. This is a seminar; regular attendance and student engagement are essential. Students are expected to attend all classes, arrive on time, and read all required reading. Receiving full points for participation is not simply a matter of showing up and turning work in on time. Outstanding participation grades require truly thoughtful, insightful, and well-argued contributions in class that demonstrate a high level of mastery of the course material. On 5 September, I will ask you to select a subsequent week when you will make a ten-minute oral presentation on the seminar topic for that day. These presentations will constitute part of the grade for class participation. Please do not exceed 10 minutes and do **NOT** summarize the required reading for that day. Pick an issue related to the required reading for that day and expand upon it beyond the required reading. Originality and use of new material will result in a higher grade. Power point presentations are recommended. I limit each unit to two students and ask for your preference in alphabetical order. Have several units in mind if your name is at the end of the alphabet.

The grading scale follows:

Excellent	Good	Needs Improvement	Low Pass	Fail
A 96-100	B+ 87-89	B- 80-83	C 74-76	F Under 70
A- 90-95	B 84-86	C+ 77-79	C- 70-73	

Office Hours

In lieu of office hours, I would like each of you to schedule one online session with me by Skype or some other platform. We can discuss whatever you wish: course material, careers in international affairs, the global situation, China-Africa issues, etc. I would like to use these sessions to get to know you better. Please schedule these discussions before the last two or three weeks of the course and preferably during the first several weeks. I also encourage questions by email. I pay close attention to email traffic and am good about responding. If email is not a satisfactory way to communicate, we can arrange a phone conversation. I do not text.

Learning Outcomes

It is important that students uphold the reputation of Elliott School graduates for strong writing and oral communication skills and command of complex international affairs issues. This class tries to accomplish these objectives by encouraging you to:

- Gain a solid understanding of the development and current state of China-Africa relations.
- Understand China's strengths and weaknesses in Africa.
- Learn how China interacts with African regional and sub-regional organizations.
- Gain an appreciation of the implications of China in Africa for US policy.
- Become aware of the most recent research on this subject and trends that may shape the future of the China-Africa relationship.
- Improve writing and oral communication skills.

Compliance with Credit Hour Policy

Over 14 weeks, students will spend 1 hour and 50 minutes (110 minutes) per week in class. Required reading for the seminar meetings, two term papers, and one oral presentation are expected to take up, on average, 6 hours (360 minutes) per week. Over the course of the semester, students will spend 25.66 hours in instructional time and 84 hours preparing for class.

Academic Integrity

Students are expected to comply with the strict standards of the George Washington University Code of Academic Integrity which can be found at <https://studentconduct.gwu.edu/sites/studentconduct.gwu.edu/files/downloads/160912%20Code>

[%20of%20Academic%20Integrity%20-%20Final.pdf](#). All members of the GWU academic community should demonstrate honesty in all of their work, including the preparation of papers.

Class Schedule

UNIT 1

29 August: An Overview of the China-Africa Relationship.

The first part of the class will be devoted to a review of the syllabus, administrative issues, and asking each student to comment on any involvement he/she has had with China and/or Africa. In the remaining time, I will provide an overview of the China-Africa relationship.

Required Reading:

Government of China white paper, “China’s Second Africa Policy Paper,” (December 2015). Direct link: http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-12/05/content_37241677.htm.

State Council Information Office white paper, “China and Africa in the New Era: A Partnership of Equals,” (November 2021). Direct link: http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/26/c_1310333813.htm.

President Xi Jinping, “Text of Speech at Opening Ceremony of 8th FOCAC Ministerial Conference” on 2 December 2021. Direct link: http://www.focac.org/eng/gdtp/202112/t20211202_10461080.htm.

David Shinn – Chapter 12 – “China in Africa” in *Africa in World Politics: Sustaining Reform in a Turbulent World Order* edited by John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (New York: Routledge, 2023). I will provide students a copy once I receive a copy of the book.

UNIT 2

5 September: History of the China-Africa Relationship.

Most of this session will consist of a lecture on the development of the China-Africa relationship since 1949, although I encourage students to ask questions and contribute their own views. We will also use this class to determine which of the next twelve sessions you want to select for your oral presentation (maximum two students per unit).

Email to me no later than 8 September a one paragraph proposal for your first research paper.

Required Reading:

David Shinn – Chapter 4 – “China-Africa Ties in Historical Context” in *China-Africa and an Economic Transformation* edited by Arkebe Oqubay and Justin Yifu Lin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). Blackboard.

George T. Yu, “China’s Failure in Africa,” *Asian Survey*, v. 6, no. 8 (August 1966), pp. 461-68. Go to E-Journals (University of California Press).

Julia C. Strauss, “The Past in the Present: Historical and Rhetorical Lineages in China’s Relations with Africa,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 199 (September 2009), pp. 777-95. Go to E-Journals (Cambridge Journals).

Zhang Xiang, “From Sino-African Relations Comes a Steady Stream of Enlightening Guidance,” *Contemporary Chinese Thought*, v. 40, no. 1 (Fall 2008), pp. 11-28. Blackboard.

UNIT 3

12 September: The Importance of Bilateral, Regional, Subregional, and Global Relations.

The strength of China’s ties with Africa is the fact that 53 of Africa’s 54 countries recognize Beijing (Eswatini recognizes Taipei) and China has cordial relations with all 53 governments. China emphasizes the state-to-state relationship above all else. But it supplements this relationship by working closely with a wide range of regional and subregional organizations, the most important of which is the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Beginning in 2020, the coronavirus pandemic interrupted much of this contact, which began to return to normal in 2023.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Appendix 1 – “Establishment of PRC Relations with African Countries,” pp. 345-49.

W.A.C. Adie, “Chou En-lai on Safari,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 18 (April-June 1964), pp. 174-94. Go to E-Journals (JSTOR).

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan 2022-2024 (30 November 2021). Direct link: http://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/202201/t20220124_10632444.htm.

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 2 – “Bilateral and Global Relations.”

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 3 – “Regional and Subregional Relations.”

UNIT 4

19 September: Political Relations and the Role of the CPC.

China bases its political relations with Africa on support for state sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of African countries. China makes frequent use of senior Communist Party of China (CPC) officials in its interaction with both government and party leaders in Africa. The leaders of ruling African political parties are often the guest of the CPC. This rarely extends to African opposition party officials. This unit also covers China's core domestic interests that have implications for its relations with African countries.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 4 – “Party-to-Party Relations.”

Shinn/Eisenman, “Evolving Principles and Guiding Concepts: How China Gains African Support for its Core National Interests,” *Orbis*, v. 64, no. 2 (February 2020), pp. 271-88. Go to E-Journals.

Zeng Aiping, “China-Africa Governance Exchanges and Experiences” (2015). Direct link: https://www.ciis.org.cn/english/COMMENTARIES/202007/t20200715_2719.html.

Paul Nantulya, “Guanxi Power, Networking, and Influence in China-Africa Relations,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies (7 December 2021). Direct link: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/guanxi-power-networking-and-influence-in-china-africa-relations/>.

Raphael Chan, “Political Training Under the Belt and Road Initiative: A Look at the Chinese Communist Party's First Party School in Africa,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (29 August 2022). Direct link: <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/08/political-training-under-the-belt-and-road-initiative-a-look-at-the-chinese-communist-partys-first-party-school-in-africa/>.

Jonathan Holslag, “China and the Coups: Coping with Political Instability in Africa,” *African Affairs*, v. 110, no. 440 (July 2011), pp. 367-86. Go to E-Journals (Oxford Journals).

UNIT 5

26 September: China-Africa Trade Relations.

In 2009, China passed the United States and became the largest trading partner with Africa's 54 countries by dollar value. China's trade lead increased in subsequent years. Africa's trade with China was roughly in balance until 2014, although many individual African countries had huge trade surpluses or deficits with China. Some of the African countries with large trade

deficits are becoming concerned about the trade imbalance. China-Africa trade peaked in 2015 and then started falling because of the economic slowdown in China and the sharp drop in global commodity prices, resulting in a continent-wide trade deficit with China. Trade began to increase after 2016 and reached a new peak in 2022, but with large African deficits.

“Data China-Africa Trade,” China Africa Research Initiative (April 2023). Direct link: <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade>.

“China-Africa Trade Surges to a Record USD 282 Billion in 2022,” China-Lusophone Brief (23 January 2023). Direct link: <https://www.clbrief.com/china-africa-trade-surges-to-a-record-usd-282-billion-in-2022/>.

Getahun Zewde, “Post 2006 Ethio-China Trade Relations: Challenges and Prospects,” *Asian Research Journal of Arts and Social Sciences* (2017). Direct link: http://www.journalrepository.org/media/journals/ARJASS_45/2017/May/Zewde322017ARJASS_33141.pdf.

Paula Jeanne Ihirwe, Godwin Norsense Osarumwense Asemota, and Samuel Bimenyimana. “Bilateral Trade Analyses Between China and East African Community Countries,” *Journal of Marketing and Consumer Research*, 46 (2018) pp. 24-32. Direct link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325669629_Bilateral_Trade_Analyses_Between_China_and_East_African_Community_Countries.

UNIT 6

3 October: China’s Foreign Direct Investment in Africa.

Figures for China’s foreign direct investment in Africa vary according to the source. It is not clear what China considers as FDI and Beijing acknowledges that its figures only capture investment that is reported officially. It misses investment that goes through tax shelters such as Hong Kong and the Cayman Islands. On the other hand, some sources include investments that are announced but never materialize. Annual Chinese investment flows to Africa in recent years have levelled off or even decreased but now exceed annual flows from the United States.

Required Reading:

“Data: Chinese Investment in Africa,” China Africa Research Initiative (April 2023). Direct link: [http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa#:~:text=Chinese%20FDI%20in%20Africa%20Data%20Overview&text=Flows%20surged%20from%20US%24%2075,Bank%20of%20China%20\(ICBC\)](http://www.sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa#:~:text=Chinese%20FDI%20in%20Africa%20Data%20Overview&text=Flows%20surged%20from%20US%24%2075,Bank%20of%20China%20(ICBC)).

Cobus van Staden, “Snapshot: How Chinese Investment in Africa is Shifting,” China Global South Project (16 May 2023). Blackboard.

J. Alexander Nuetah and Xian Xin, “Has China’s Investment Pattern in Sub-Saharan Africa Been Driven by Natural Resource Quest?” *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies*, v. 11, no. 3 (2019), pp. 215-31. Go to E-Journals.

Thierry Pairault, “China in Africa: Goods Supplier, Service Provider Rather than Investor,” *Bridges Africa*, 5 no. 7 (5 July 2018). Direct link <https://www.pairault.fr/sinaf/doc/bridges2018.pdf>.

Yike Fu, “The Quiet China-Africa Revolution: Chinese Investment,” *The Diplomat* (22 November 2021). Direct link: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/the-quiet-china-africa-revolution-chinese-investment/>.

UNIT 7

10 October: China’s Aid to Africa.

Although reliable Chinese aid statistics for each African country are not available (China treats bilateral aid figures as a state secret), China is becoming an increasingly important aid donor. In the past several years, its annual OECD-equivalent aid to Africa has probably been about \$1.5 billion. This compares to \$9 billion annually from the United States. Most of the aid is the concessionary component of some loans, interest-free loans, and grants. Just under half of China’s global development assistance goes to Africa. China emphasizes that its aid, unlike that from the United States, has no political conditionality, although as noted in Unit 4 that argument is questionable.

The first paper is due today. Please submit the paper as a WORD document to dhshinn@earthlink.net and dhshinn@gwu.edu.

Required Reading:

“Data: Chinese Global Foreign Aid,” China Africa Research Initiative (April 2023). Direct link: <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-global-foreign-aid>.

Kevin Acker and Deborah Brautigam, “Twenty Years of Data on China’s Africa Lending,” China Africa Research Initiative (March 2021). Direct link: <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5652847de4b033f56d2bdc29/t/605cb1891cb0ff5747b12167/1616687497984/BP+4+-+Acker%2C+Brautigam+-+20+Years+of+Data+on+African+Lending.pdf>.

United Nations Development Programme, “Brief on White Paper on China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era” (5 February 2021). Direct link: <https://www.undp.org/china/publications/issue-brief-brief-white-paper-chinas-international-development-cooperation-new-era>.

Leah Lynch, Sharon Andersen, and Tianyu Zhu, “China’s Foreign Aid: A Primer for Recipient Countries, Donors, and Aid Providers,” Center for Global Development (July 2020). Direct link: <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/chinas-foreign-aid-primer-recipient-countries-donors-and-aid-providers.pdf>.

Jingdong Yuan, Fei Su, and Xuwan Ouyang, “China’s Evolving Approach to Foreign Aid,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, policy paper 62 (May 2022). Direct link: <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/sipripp62.pdf>.

Anzette Were, “Debt Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa’s Development Options,” South African Institute of International Affairs Policy Insights 66 (August 2018). Direct link: https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/sai_spi_66_were_20190910.pdf.

UNIT 8

17 October: Propaganda, Media, Education and Culture.

China has emphasized these areas since the beginning of its interaction with Africa in the late 1950s. In China, propaganda does not have a pejorative connotation. Media engagement has evolved from an early heavy-handed approach by Xinhua to a more sophisticated operation that has become the largest news service in Africa. It has been joined by increasingly strong programming from China Radio International and China Global Television Network. China offers about 10,000 fully paid scholarships annually, although the program was interrupted by COVID-19 and remains hindered by the language barrier. It also pays considerable attention to cultural exchanges but has been unable to compete effectively with American music and films, European football, and even Indian films. Confucius Institutes are among the more recent additions to China’s soft power in Africa. The government controls all these programs.

The proposal for the second paper is due today.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 5 – “Africa-Focused Propaganda.”

Xin Xin, “Xinhua News Agency in Africa,” *Journal of African Media Studies*, v. 1, no. 3 (2009), pp. 363-77. Go to E-Journals.

Herman Wasserman, “China-Africa Media Relations: What We Know So Far,” *Global Media and China*, 3, No. 2 (2018), pp. 108-112. Direct link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326312649_China-Africa_media_relations_What_we_know_so_far.

Kathryn Batchelor, “Twenty-first Century Sino-African Cultural Cooperation: Exploring Reciprocity,” in *China-Africa Relations: Building Images Through Cultural Cooperation, Media Representation and Communication* edited by Kathryn Batchelor and Xiaoling Zhang. Routledge (2017), pp. 75-97. Blackboard.

Kenneth King, “Confucius Institutes in Africa: Culture and Language Without Controversy?” in *China-Africa Relations: Building Images Through Cultural Cooperation, Media Representation and Communication* edited by Kathryn Batchelor and Xiaoling Zhang. Routledge (2017), pp. 98-112. Blackboard.

Taling Tene Rodrigue and Yao Jiaojiao, “Kungfu Movies as Driver of China-Africa Cultural Exchanges: Case Study of Cameroon,” *International Journal of African and Asian Studies* (2017), pp. 45-54. Direct link: <http://iiste.org/Journals/index.php/JAAS/article/view/37845/38928>.

UNIT 9

24 October: Security Strategy, Protecting Interests, and Managing Conflict.

Africa is a low security priority for China compared to countries on its periphery and Western powers. Nevertheless, Africa has grown in importance because of China’s interest in African energy, minerals, and as a source of food. As China’s presence has increased in Africa, its nationals and interests have experienced increasing threats. China has responded by giving more attention to mitigating attacks on its people and harm to its interests. It has made greater use of private security companies, improved its ability to evacuate its nationals, emphasized the prevention and mediation of conflict, and continued its support for UN peacekeeping operations.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 6 – “Security Strategy and Interests.”

“The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper,” China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (21 February 2023). Direct link: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html.

Alice Ekman, “China’s Global Security Initiative,” European Union Institute for Security Studies (March 2023). Direct link: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_5_China%27s%20Global%20Security%20Initiative.pdf.

Robert Bociaga, “Minerals and China’s Military Assistance in the DR Congo,” *The Diplomat* (31 October 2022). Direct link: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/minerals-and-chinas-military-assistance-in-the-dr-congo/>.

Zongyuan Zoe Liu, “China Increasingly Relies on Imported Food. That’s a Problem.” Council on Foreign Relations (25 January 2023). Direct link: <https://www.cfr.org/article/china-increasingly-relies-imported-food-thats-problem>.

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 7 – “Protecting Interests and Managing Conflict.”

Xiaohong Xu, “China’s Engagement in African Security Affairs in the Post-Cold War Era,” *International Relations and Diplomacy* (2017), pp. 412-425. Direct link: <http://www.davidpublisher.com/Public/uploads/Contribute/59a38bf079db5.pdf>.

Alessandro Arduino, “Chinese Private Security Firms Are Growing Their Presence in Africa: Why It Matters,” *The Conversation* (8 August 2022). Direct link: <https://theconversation.com/chinese-private-security-firms-are-growing-their-presence-in-africa-why-it-matters-187309>.

Sunghee Cho, “China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations since the 2000s,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, v. 28, no. 117 (2019), pp. 482-98. Go to E-Journals.

UNIT 10

31 October: Security Diplomacy.

As China’s presence and interests have grown in Africa, so too have its security concerns and use of tools to respond to those concerns in cooperation with African governments. China has established a couple of security forums with Africans, continued military exchange visits and the assignment of military attaches to its embassies in Africa, expanded its portfolio of arms transfers, increased training exercises, engaged in more construction of military and police facilities, improved security-related humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and devoted greater effort to counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 8 “Security Diplomacy.”

Richard D. Fisher, “China Militarizes Its Influence in Africa,” *The National Interest* (25 November 2018). Direct link: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-militarizes-its-influence-africa-36667>.

Cortney Weinbaum, Melissa Shostak, Chandler Sachs, John V. Parachini, “Mapping Chinese and Russian Military and Security Exports to Africa,” RAND Corporation (2022). Direct link: <https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TLA2045-3.html>.

“Chinese-built Military Training Centre Opens in Tanzania,” *Defence Web* (13 February 2018). Direct link: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50704:chinese-built-military-training-centre-opens-in-tanzania&catid=50:Land&Itemid=105.

Paul Nantulya, “China’s Policing Models Make Inroads in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies (22 May 2023). Direct link: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinas-policing-models-make-inroads-in-africa/>.

Meia Nouwens, “The Evolving Nature of China’s Military Diplomacy: From Visits to Vaccines,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies (May 2021). Direct link: <https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/the-evolving-nature-of-chinas-military-diplomacy---from-visits-to-vaccines.pdf>.

UNIT 11

7 November: Maritime Security.

All of the oil and minerals exported from Africa to China pass through the Western Indian Ocean. Safe transport of these products in addition to other imports and China’s exports to Africa and through the Red Sea to Europe constitute a growing security concern. As China expands its nuclear submarine fleet and builds its carrier capacity, it clearly has in mind a naval role that includes the “far seas” such as the Western Indian Ocean and Mediterranean. Chinese vessels and crews have been subject to attack and capture by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. This region is experiencing more great power competition and China is devoting more effort to exert influence there, especially by developing ports. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased port calls and naval exercises with African navies. Beijing established its first naval base outside China in Djibouti. Eventually, China can be expected to extend its naval capacity to Africa’s entire coastline.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 9 – “Maritime Security.”

Darshana M. Baruah, “Maritime Competition in the Indian Ocean,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (12 May 2022). Direct link: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/12/maritime-competition-in-indian-ocean-pub-87093>.

Yves-Heng Lim, “China’s Rising Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean, Aligning Ends, Ways and Means,” *Asian Security*, 16, no. 3 (2020), pp. 396-412. Go to E-Journals.

Isaac Kardon and Wendy Leutert, “China’s Port Power,” *Foreign Affairs* (22 May 2023). Go to E-Journals.

Hans Uwe Mergener, “‘Mosi II’ Naval Exercise Concluded, But Ramifications Continue,” *European Security & Defence* (3 March 2023). Direct link: <https://euro-sd.com/2023/03/news/29908/mosi-ii-naval-exercise-concluded-but-ramifications-continue/>.

David Shinn, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Security in the Red Sea Region,” Middle East Institute (18 May 2021). Direct link: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinas-maritime-silk-road-and-security-red-sea-region>.

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, 29, no. 125 (2020), pp. 731-747. Go to E-Journals.

UNIT 12

14 November: Technology and Information Security.

China has had modest success with African countries in the areas of nuclear and space cooperation but has excelled in the field of information technology. China is also one of the leaders in Africa in artificial intelligence, surveillance technology, and cybersecurity. Beijing appreciates both the commercial and security advantages of engaging with Africa in these areas. The technology is changing rapidly and companies from all countries competing for the African market are experiencing fierce competition, but Chinese companies have done well.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 10 – Technology and Information Security.

Dale Aluf, “China’s Tech Outreach in the Middle East and North Africa,” *The Diplomat* (17 November 2022). Direct link: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/chinas-tech-outreach-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/>.

Leonard Sengere, “Half of All Smartphones Sold in Africa Are Transsion Brands. How Did Itel, Tecno and Infinix’s Parent Get So Dominant?” *Techzim* (9 March 2022). Direct link: <https://www.techzim.co.zw/2022/03/transsion-takes-50-of-african-smartphone-sales-find-out-about-itel-tecno-infinix-parent/>.

Bulelani Jili, “Africa’s Demand for and Adoption of Chinese Surveillance Technology.” Atlantic Council (May 2023). Direct link: <https://dfrlab.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2023/05/Africas-Demand-for-an-Adoption-of-Chinese-Surveillance-Technology.pdf>.

Abdi Latif Dahir, “Chinese Firms Are Driving the Rise of AI Surveillance Across Africa,” *Quartz Africa* (18 September 2019). Direct link: <https://www.yahoo.com/now/chinese->

[firms-driving-rise-ai-132322407.html?gucounter=1&gucere_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&gucere_referrer_sig=AQAAAHtISp4D3Sk1Hgk1kEa6tjvcbnXjWobth--VWwo9HEehFOMciVQfWWvgHmd1mxYl0WPY6BcN-If-0bMLtMwhFy3L10MmTsFsL_rR_ov0K8A431Y18oxCeSiLpH42kvlRHZeHZ-zqkxe7fBCsNaHX8GePjBTT0teKveERcOLF3Lwe](https://www.firms-driving-rise-ai-132322407.html?gucounter=1&gucere_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&gucere_referrer_sig=AQAAAHtISp4D3Sk1Hgk1kEa6tjvcbnXjWobth--VWwo9HEehFOMciVQfWWvgHmd1mxYl0WPY6BcN-If-0bMLtMwhFy3L10MmTsFsL_rR_ov0K8A431Y18oxCeSiLpH42kvlRHZeHZ-zqkxe7fBCsNaHX8GePjBTT0teKveERcOLF3Lwe).

Heidi Swart, “Visual Surveillance and Weak Cyber Security, Part One: When Cameras Get Dangerous,” *Daily Maverick* (13 June 2019). Direct link: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-06-13-visual-surveillance-and-weak-cyber-security-part-one-when-cameras-get-dangerous/>.

Rong Wang, Francois Bar, and Yu Hong, “ICT Aid Flows from China to African Countries: A Communication Network Perspective,” *International Journal of Communication*, 14 (2020), pp. 1-25. Direct link: <https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/9973/3006>.

UNIT 13

28 November: Implications of Rising China-Africa Ties for the United States.

The rise of China in Africa presents challenges for the United States but also opens some areas for cooperation, depending on the status of the China-US relationship. There is obvious competition in trade, investment, the winning of contracts, access to strategic resources, and African support in international forums. If the Sino-American relationship is positive, there are possibilities for cooperation in peacekeeping, supporting political stability in Africa, and enhancing economic development in areas such as health care and agriculture. At the moment, the Sino-American relationship is challenging and leaves little room for cooperation in Africa.

The second paper is due today. Please submit the paper as a WORD document to dhshinn@earthlink.net and dhshinn@gwu.edu.

Required Reading:

Wang Lei, “China and the United States in Africa: Competition or Cooperation?” *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies*, v. 6, no. 1 (2020) pp. 123-141. Direct link: <https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/epdf/10.1142/S2377740020500037>.

Joseph Sany and Thomas P. Sheehy, “Sidestepping Great Power Rivalry: U.S.-China Competition in Africa,” US Institute of Peace (28 April 2021). Direct link: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/04/sidestepping-great-power-rivalry-us-china-competition-africa>.

George Ward, Eric Kiss, and Pat Savage, “The Eagle and the Dragon in Africa: Comparing Data on Chinese and American Influence,” *War on the Rocks* (6 May 2021). Direct link: <https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/the-eagle-and-the-dragon-in-africa-comparing-data-on-chinese-and-american-influence/>.

Ilaria Carrozza and Nicholas J. Marsh, “Great Power Competition and China’s Security Assistance to Africa: Arms, Training, and Influence,” *Journal of Global Security Studies*, 7, no. 4 (2022), pp. 1-14. Go to E-Journals.

Thomas P. Sheehy, “10 Things to Know about the U.S.-China Rivalry in Africa,” US Institute of Peace (7 December 2022). Direct link: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/12/10-things-know-about-us-china-rivalry-africa>.

UNIT 14

5 December: The Future of the China-Africa Relationship.

China is in Africa to stay. The relationship is important to both sides. But the more China engages in Africa the more complicated the relationship becomes and the more problems and challenges both sides face. There are increasing numbers of Chinese living in Africa, at least pre-COVID-19, and they are encountering more difficulties. China’s activities in Africa and its policies on human rights, democratization, the environment, respect for labor laws, and competition with African traders and industry present challenges for China. For their part, African countries seek to maximize the benefits they obtain from such an important player on the international stage.

Required Reading:

Shinn/Eisenman – Chapter 11 – “Projecting Trends in China-Africa Strategic Relations.”

Mehari Taddele Maru, “Why Africa Loves China,” *Aljazeera* (6 January 2019). Direct link: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/africa-loves-china-190103121552367.html>.

Brendon J. Cannon, “Is China Undermining Its Own Success in Africa?” *The Diplomat* (8 February 2019). Direct link: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/is-china-undermining-its-own-success-in-africa/>.

Leah Lynch, Hannah Ryder, and Jing Cai, “Is the Africa-China Relationship at Its Lowest or Highest Level Yet?” *The Diplomat* (6 December 2021). Direct link: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/is-the-africa-china-relationship-at-its-lowest-or-highest-level-yet/>.

Yun Sun, “An Examination of the 2035 Vision for China-Africa Cooperation, Brookings (27 December 2021). Direct link: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/12/27/an-examination-of-the-2035-vision-for-china-africa-cooperation/>.

Eric A. Miller, “More Chinese Military Bases in Africa: A Question of When, Not If,” *Foreign Policy* (16 August 2022). Blackboard.

David Shinn, “China and Africa: Challenges and Predictions,” Speech to the Cosmopolitan Club in New York on 8 April 2013. Blackboard.

University Policies and Services

University Policies & Services

Academic Integrity Code

Academic dishonesty is defined as cheating of any kind, including misrepresenting one's own work, taking credit for the work of others without crediting them and without appropriate authorization, and the fabrication of information. For details and complete code, see: studentconduct.gwu.edu/code-academic-integrity

Use of Artificial Intelligence

Papers submitted for this course should not contain any content (e.g., ideas, text, images) that was generated, in whole or in part, by Generative Artificial Intelligence tools (including, but not limited to, ChatGPT and other large language models). Doing so in this course constitutes cheating under the George Washington University Code of Academic Integrity.

Accommodations for Students with Disabilities

Any student who may need an accommodation based on the potential impact of a disability should contact the Disability Support Services office at 202-994-8250 in the Rome Hall, Suite 102, to establish eligibility and to coordinate reasonable accommodations. For additional information see: disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/

Religious Observances

In accordance with University policy, students should notify faculty during the first week of the semester of their intention to be absent from class on their day(s) of religious observance. For details and policy, see: <https://registrar.gwu.edu/university-policies#holidays>

Mental Health Services 202-994-5300

The University's Mental Health Services offers 24/7 assistance and referral to address students' personal, social, career, and study skills problems. Services for students include crisis and emergency mental health consultations confidential assessment, counseling services (individual and small group), and referrals. For additional information see: counselingcenter.gwu.edu/

Emergency Preparedness and Response Procedures

The University has asked all faculty to inform students of these procedures, prepared by the GW Office of Public Safety and Emergency Management in collaboration with the Office of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs.

To Report an Emergency or Suspicious Activity

Call the University Police Department at 202-994-6111 (Foggy Bottom) or 202-242-6111 (Mount Vernon).

Shelter in Place – General Guidance

Although it is unlikely that we will ever need to shelter in place, it is helpful to know what to do just in case. No matter where you are, the basic steps of shelter in place will generally remain the same.

- If you are inside, stay where you are unless the building you are in is affected. If it is affected, you should evacuate. If you are outdoors, proceed into the closest building or follow instructions from emergency personnel on the scene.
- Locate an interior room to shelter inside. If possible, it should be above ground level and have the fewest number of windows. If sheltering in a room with windows, move away from the windows. If there is a large group of people inside a particular building, several rooms may be necessary.
- Shut and lock all windows (for a tighter seal) and close exterior doors.
- Turn off air conditioners, heaters, and fans. Close vents to ventilation systems as you are able. (University staff will turn off ventilation systems as quickly as possible).
- Make a list of the people with you and ask someone to call the list in to UPD so they know where you are sheltering and who is with you. If only students are present, one of the students should call in the list.
- Await further instructions. If possible, visit GW Campus Advisories for incident updates (<http://CampusAdvisories.gwu.edu>) or call the GW Information Line 202-994-5050.
- Make yourself comfortable and look after one other. You will get word as soon as it is safe to come out.

Evacuation

An evacuation will be considered if the building we are in is affected or we must move to a location of greater safety. We will always evacuate if the fire alarm sounds. In the event of an evacuation, please gather your personal belongings quickly (purse, keys, GWorld card, etc.) and proceed to the nearest exit. Every classroom has a map at the door designating both the shortest egress and an alternate egress. Anyone who is physically unable to walk down the stairs should wait in the stairwell, behind the closed doors. Firemen will check the stairwells upon entering the building.

Once you have evacuated the building, proceed to our primary rendezvous location: the court yard area between the GW Hospital and Ross Hall. In the event that this location is unavailable, we will meet on the ground level of the Visitors Parking Garage (I Street entrance, at 22nd Street). From our rendezvous location, we will await instructions to re-enter the School.

Alert DC

Alert DC provides free notification by e-mail or text message during an emergency. Visit GW Campus Advisories for a link and instructions on how to sign up for alerts pertaining to GW. If you receive an Alert DC notification during class, you are encouraged to share the information immediately.

GW Alert

GW Alert provides popup notification to desktop and laptop computers during an emergency. In the event that we receive an alert to the computer in our classroom, we will follow the instructions given. You are also encouraged to download this application to your personal computer. Visit GW Campus Advisories to learn how.

Additional Information

Additional information about emergency preparedness and response at GW or the University's operating status can be found on GW Campus Advisories (<http://CampusAdvisories.gwu.edu>) or by calling the GW Information Line at 202-994-5050.

